ON THE ECONOMICS OF LAW AND ORDER (FROM THE ECONOMICS OF CRIME AND LAW ENFORCEMENT, 1976 BY LEE R MCPHETERS AND WILLIAM B STRONGE - SEE NCJ-37726)

• NCJ Number: 37728
• Author(s): J R HARRIS
• Date Published: 1976
• Length: 12 pages
• Corporate Author: Charles C. Thomas
• Publication Format: Document
• Language: English
• Country: United States of America

Annotation

THIS PAPER CONSIDERS THE IMPLICATIONS OF VARYING DEGREES OF LEGAL SAFEGUARDS FOR SUSPECTS AND THE RESULTING SOCIAL LOSS FROM WRONGFUL PUNISHMENT ON THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT.

Abstract

A MATHEMATICAL MODEL IS DEVELOPED AND USED TO SHOW THAT IF THE PERCEIVED SOCIAL LOSS ARISING FROM UNJUST PUNISHMENT RISES, GREATER LEGAL SAFEGUARDS AND LOWER LEVELS OF APPREHENSION AND PUNISHMENT WILL BE CALLED FOR. ALTERNATIVELY, INCREASED LOSS FROM CRIMES CALLS FOR INCREASES IN APPREHENSION AND PUNISHMENT AND FOR RELAXED LEGAL SAFEGUARDS. IF COSTS OF APPREHENSION RISE, HARSHER PUNISHMENTS AND RELAXED LEGAL SAFEGUARDS WILL BE REQUIRED. BY CONSIDERING THE OPTIMAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT, THIS PAPER EXTENDS THE BECKER ECONOMIC ANALYSIS MODEL FOR DERIVING CRITERIA FOR OPTIMAL LEVELS OF EXPENDITURE ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE FORM OF PUNISHMENT (SEE NCJ-37727). A DETAILED DISCUSSION OF THE MATHEMATICAL MODEL IS CONTAINED IN THE APPENDIX. REFERENCES ARE PROVIDED. (AUTHOR ABSTRACT MODIFIED)