NCJ Number
11416
Date Published
1964
Length
262 pages
Annotation
THE RANGE OF BEHAVIORS OPEN TO JUSTICES OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT WHO WISH TO IMPLEMENT THEIR ECONOMIC OR SOCIAL POLICY OBJECTIVES.
Abstract
THE SUPREME COURT IS VIEWED AS A POLICY-MAKING BODY WHOSE MEMBERS CAN INFLUENCE ONE ANOTHER IN THE PURSUIT OF INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE'S GOALS. THE INTERNAL WORKINGS OF THE SUPREME COURT ARE EXAMINED USING EXCERPTS FROM THE PRIVATE PAPERS OF FORMER JUSTICES WHICH DISPLAY THEIR ATTEMPTS TO INFLUENCE AND PERSUADE THEIR FELLOW JUSTICES, LEGISLATORS, AND PRESIDENTS. IN ORDER TO SUPPLY A NOTION OF THE FRAMEWORK WITHIN WHICH JUDICIAL DECISIONMAKING TAKES PLACE, A CHAPTER EXAMINES THE SOURCES OF AND LIMITATIONS ON JUDICIAL POWER. ITS PURPOSE IS TO REFRESH MEMORIES AND TO PUT WELL-KNOWN FACTS IN AN ORDERLY ARRANGEMENT RATHER THAN TO SUPPLY NEW INFORMATION. FOUR CHAPTERS ARE ORGANIZED AROUND A DISCUSSION OF HOW A JUSTICE CAN MINIMIZE, THOUGH HE PROBABLY MAY NEVER OVERCOME, THE MAJOR INSTITUTIONAL CHECKS ON HIS POWER. THE LAST TWO CHAPTERS ATTEMPT TO DRAW SOME MORE GENERAL CONCLUSIONS ABOUT THE ETHICS OF LIMITED CHOICE AS WELL AS ABOUT JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR. (AUTHOR ABSTRACT MODIFIED)