NCJ Number
152523
Journal
Journal of Social Issues Volume: 50 Issue: 2 Dated: special issue (Summer 1994) Pages: 177-197
Date Published
1994
Length
21 pages
Annotation
In recent decades, the U.S. Supreme Court seemed increasingly receptive to social science evidence in a variety of contexts and appeared poised in the early 1970's to employ such evidence in its consideration of the death penalty; this expectation, however, was not fulfilled.
Abstract
Supreme Court decisions in most death penalty cases since Gregg v. Georgia (1976) have shown little interest in social science evidence. For example, although the Supreme Court often cites public sentiment as the basis for decisions about evolving standards for what is cruel and unusual punishment, it has not appreciated the measurement issues associated with gauging such sentiment. The authors discuss various reasons why the Supreme Court may have eschewed social science evidence in death penalty litigation. They suggest an agenda for future research that is driven not simply by litigation prospects but also by more general questions about jury decisionmaking and that focuses on such areas as juror reactions to arguments in death penalty cases, deterrence for special defendant categories, measuring standards of decency, and juror response to and understanding of judicial instructions. 61 references