NCJ Number
103455
Journal
Drake Law Review Volume: 34 Issue: 1 Dated: (1984-1985) Pages: 33-134
Date Published
1985
Length
102 pages
Annotation
This article examines the development and rationale of the exclusionary rule and offers a critique of arguments put forth by its proponents.
Abstract
Exclusionary proponents press three arguments: there exists a personal constitutional right to exclusion of illegally obtained evidence, such evidence jeopardizes the integrity of judges and taints the judiciary, and the exclusion of such evidence assures fidelity to constitutional provisions. It is argued that, contrary to such arguments, the U.S. Supreme Court's imposition of the rule lacks legitimacy. The task of overseeing and remedying Bill of Rights violations is ultimately a legislative rather than a judicial one. Those who suggest that the exclusionary rule is a personal constitutional right adopt one or more unsupportable premises. They either define Bill of Rights provisions in a fashion that cannot be attributed to its authors, substitute their judgment of good public policy measures for those put forth by the authors, or claim a judicial power inconsistent with American legal traditions. By invoking its authority, the U.S. Supreme Court substitutes judicial for legislative judgment under the rubric of constitutional interpretation. 554 footnotes.