NCJ Number
173648
Date Published
1998
Length
78 pages
Annotation
This essay addresses the current criminal law debates about excusing by analyzing the issues and arguments concerning excusing in general and the new excuses in particular; the analysis concludes that the current system of criminal blame and punishment is coherent and fair in principle and can accommodate the claims for new excuses.
Abstract
The essay concludes that the fairness of blaming and punishing is immune from attacks based on the possible truth of determinism, which allegedly would render these practices unjust. The discussion also provides a general and unifying defense of responsibility and the excuses. It notes that many of the new claims can be brought within current criminal law defenses, although with reasonable modifications to current doctrine in some cases. It emphasizes that newly defined mental disorders and other syndromes that underpin claims for new excuses do not raise new legal issues that require substantial restructuring of criminal law theory or doctrine, even if they do raise fresh biomedical or social scientific issues. Modifications to existing doctrine are generally preferable to the wholesale creation of new excusing conditions. The analysis also provides and defends a generic theory of excusing and a new, generic doctrine of partial excuse that would justly respond to increased understanding of human behavior. 72 references (Author abstract modified)