NCJ Number
97419
Journal
Ohio State Law Review Volume: 44 Issue: 2 Dated: (1983) Pages: 393-445
Date Published
1983
Length
53 pages
Annotation
This article interprets the exhaustion doctrine in Federal habeas corpus as a discretionary rule regarding the appropriate timing of Federal collateral review, rather than the ground for precluding the use of the Federal forum in such cases, as the Burger Court is said to reason.
Abstract
The initial decision in the field -- Ex parte Royall, which placed primary emphasis on the Federal habeas courts' jurisdictional power to inquire into the cause of a prisoner's detention and to order discharge if the custody under attack is found in violation of Federal law -- is reviewed. Modern courts are urged to take seriously the message in Royall and to defer Federal review in habeas cases. The birth of the exhaustion doctrine is traced to 1885 and the restoration of the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction; details of the Royall case are supplied, and attention focuses on the years immediately following Royall. Codification in section 2254 is analyzed, and its effect is considered. Also examined are section 2254(b)'s requirement that applications for habeas relief shall not be granted in the absence of exhaustion and the statute's failure to address exhaustion in cases in which habeas relief is denied. Recent cases indicating that the exhaustion doctrine affects the Federal courts' power to adjudicate are highlighted, including Rose v. Lundy. Justice O'Connor's attempt to link the total exhaustion rule with the scheme established by section 2254 Rule 9 is described, and the effect of the Supreme Court's attitude regarding exhaustion on the lower courts sitting in habeas is examined. Suggestions for improvements in the Court's handling and interpretation of the exhaustion rule are included, as are 290 footnotes.