NCJ Number
79963
Journal
American Criminal Law Review Volume: 19 Issue: 1 Dated: (Summer 1981) Pages: 1-48
Date Published
1981
Length
48 pages
Annotation
This paper explores the propriety of psychiatric prediction testimony at capital sentencing by examining both evidentiary and due process considerations and concludes that the use of such testimony presents exceptional problems of reliability assessment for juries and violates legal standards.
Abstract
Although the American Psychiatric Association argued that the Constitution prohibits reliance on psychiatric predictions of long-term future criminal behavior in making a life or death sentencing decision, the Supreme Court in Estelle v. Smith failed to address the constitutional problems posed by the Texas statute which placed the issue of a convicted capital defendant's dangerousness directly before a sentencing jury. Since several States have similar capital sentencing frameworks, the admissibility of mental health professional testimony constitutes a significant evidentiary problem. A de novo examination of the admissibility of such testimony under standard rules of evidence concludes that it might well be held inadmissible as addressing an area not properly the subject of expert or scientific testimony. However, careful analysis under local evidence doctrine is unlikely because of the long history of uncritical acceptance, the insulation provided to expert testimony in the sentencing proceeding, and State courts' zealously protected prerogatives regarding their sentencing flexibility. A review of the Supreme Court's capital sentencing cases, however, suggests that due process imposes unusually stringent requirements in this context. Because the Court's decisions offer only minimal guidance, cases addressing the due process requirements imposed at the guilt-innocence stage of trial are discussed, including those involving confessions, eyewitness testimony, testimony not subjected to confrontation, and the exercise of self-incrimination. These decisions provide significant support for the proposition that Federal constitutional considerations may, in limited instances, reasonably prohibit trusting juries from evaluating accurately the credibility of certain kinds of evidence. Expert prediction testimony is an appropriate subject for exclusion under this nascent bar since it is a readily definable category and presents exceptional difficulties in reliability assessment. The nature of these reliability problems impedes the ability of the adversary system to develop fully the base for an objective jury assessment because traditional techniques such as cross examination and rebuttal are often ineffectual. The potential for inaccurate assessment of this testimony's credibility and a corresponding inaccurate decision to impose the death penalty is high. Some constitutional restraints on the admissibility of prediction testimony are needed and should not disrupt the Federal-State balance in the area of capital sentencing. The article contains 234 footnotes.