NCJ Number
81404
Journal
Rutgers Law Review Volume: 29 Dated: (1975-1976) Pages: 1084-1101
Date Published
1976
Length
18 pages
Annotation
The evidentiary standards used to establish guilt in court are used to examine the evidence demonstrating psychiatrists' inability to predict dangerousness accurately and to discuss the proposed application of these standards of proof to the supposed expert testimony of psychiatrists on dangerousness.
Abstract
The evidentiary standards used are a preponderance of evidence, clear and convincing evidence, and evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. Existing literature on dangerousness prediction suggests that psychiatrists cannot predict dangerousness since the concept is not usually clearly defined, that the mentally ill are less often arrested than the general population, and the psychiatrists cannot be realistically expected to predict dangerousness accurately because of the theoretical and practical obstacles associated with the prediction of infrequent events, such as dangerous behavior. Direct evidence of the inaccuracy of psychiatric prediction is neither abundant nor consistent, and studies offering clear and convincing evidence conclude that psychiatric predictions of dangerous are inaccurate. Overall, a preponderance of evidence exists that would probably constitute proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the inability of psychiatrists to predict accurately. One solution is to have legislators rewrite mental health laws to remove all use of dangerousness criteria or for the public to be educated to recognize that no direct relationship between mental illness and dangerousness exists. A total of 58 footnotes are included.