NCJ Number
80907
Journal
Baylor Law Review Volume: 33 Issue: 4 Dated: (Fall 1981) Pages: 1035-1043
Date Published
1981
Length
9 pages
Annotation
The topics discussed are the purpose of the felony murder rule, restrictions on the scope of the felony murder rule through the merger doctrine, the merger doctrine in Texas, and a suggestion for dealing with the Texas difficulties in applying the merger doctrine.
Abstract
Felony murder is used in nearly every State as a means of convicting a defendant of murder without the necessity of proving a specific intent to kill. The rule transfers the culpable mental state required to prove the commission of a felony to any homicide that occurs while the felony is being committed. Most courts have limited the impact of the rule by adopting the merger doctrine, which states that unless the underlying felony has an independent purpose distinct from the homicide, it will merge with the homicide and will not support a murder charge. Texas recently adopted the merger theory in the case of Garrett v. State, in which the underlying felony was aggravated assault. The court quoted Judge Cardozo's statement that 'the felony that eliminates the quality of the intent must be one that is independent of the homicide and of the assault merged therein, as, e.g., robbery or larceny or burglary or rape.' In Ex parte Easter, however, the court dealt a severe blow to the newly adopted merger doctrine by ruling that the felony injury to a child could be used to support a felony murder charge. The court should further simplify its approach to felony murder by requiring a separate mens rea for the dangerous act. Further, if intent, knowledge, or recklessness were held to be required for the commission of the dangerous act under section 6.02(c) of the Texas Penal Code, this difficulty could be avoided. Sixty-eight footnotes are provided. (Author summary modified)