Fighting Networked Terrorist Groups: Lessons From Israel

• NCJ Number: 218207
• Journal: Studies in Conflict & Terrorism Volume: 30 Issue: 4 Dated: April 2007 Pages: 281-302
• Author(s): Seth G. Jones
• Date Published: April 2007
• Length: 22 pages
• Publication Format: Article
• Publication Type: Legislation/Policy Analysis
• Language: English
• Country: United States of America

Annotation

Based on an analysis of Israeli operations against Palestinian groups during Operation Defense Shield in 2002, this study proposes an effective strategy for the U.S. military to use against "networked" terrorist groups, i.e., groups without a geographically located central command or large concentration of identifiable combatants.

Abstract

The author argues that networked strategies can be effective against networked organizations. Keys to success in a networked strategy are constant communication among units, good intelligence, the ability to transfer intelligence quickly, and the willingness to operate in small units. There is no significant challenge to the superiority of U.S. military equipment in a test of force against another armed military force in a contest to control a geographic area. This means that adversaries of the United States will increasingly resort to networked guerilla operations in areas where the U.S. military is operating. Sustained insurgency campaigns and rising levels of violence in Afghanistan and Iraq suggest that the U.S. military has not mastered the art of countering networked adversaries. Israel faced this challenge in Operation Defensive Shield, conducted in April of 2002. The Israeli military deployed approximately 30,000 troops to 6 West Bank cities in response to a Passover suicide bombing at the Park Hotel in Netanya, following a wave of attacks in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In response to the dispersed nature of Palestinian groups, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) established a number of small networked units in order to penetrate the refugee camps and casbahs, swarm together from all directions, and kill or capture Palestinian militants. Most IDF commanders, including brigade-level commanders, received significant training in unconventional warfare. Human intelligence had a central role in counterinsurgency operations. 5 figures and 72 notes