NCJ Number
88029
Journal
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology Volume: 73 Issue: 3 Dated: (Fall 1982) Pages: 916-938
Date Published
1982
Length
23 pages
Annotation
Implementation of the reasonable, good faith exception to the exclusionary rule would limit the rule's application to the furtherance of its original purpose of deterring clearly defined police misconduct.
Abstract
The exclusionary rule provides that contraband or other forms of incriminating evidence obtained by unlawful police activity may not be used to prove guilt in a criminal trial. Proponents of the rule argue that by depriving the police of the fruit of their misconduct (evidence used to help obtain a conviction) the police will lose any incentive for engaging in such behavior (deterrence). Critics of the rule claim that the case law interpreting the rule has become so confused and contradictory that police cannot know whether or not their conduct is lawful and that the rule has been interpreted by the courts to apply to situations where it cannot possibly serve as a deterrent. Given that deterrence is the rationale for the rule, in situations where police officers have performed a search or seizure reasonably and in good faith belief that their conduct conforms with the law, it is indefensible to exclude the evidence they have gathered. When a court does order suppression of evidence in such circumstances, it imposes a label of police misconduct when there is none. The result is that police officers are branded for misconduct, public trust in the police is undermined, and the determination of guilt or innocence is made without assessment of all the probative and trustworthy evidence available. Application of the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule would preserve its effect upon clear and flagrant police misconduct while using the good faith standard in those borderline circumstances where precedent has not established clear standards for police conduct. A total of 125 footnotes are provided.