Good Governance: A Mere Motto or a Pragmatic Endeavour for a Realistic Strategy? (The French Example of an Anti-Corruption Agency) (From Resource Material Series No. 56, P 343-364, 2000, Hiroshi Iitsuka and Rebecca Findlay-Debeck, eds. -- See NCJ-191475)

• NCJ Number: 191499
• Author(s): Laurence Giovacchini
• Date Published: December 2000
• Length: 22 pages
• Sale Source: United Nations Asia and Far East Institute for the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders
• Publication Format: Document
• Publication Type: Issue Overview
• Language: English
• Country: Japan
• Note: A paper from the 113th UNAFEI International Training Course, "The Effective Administration of Criminal Justice for the Prevention of Corrupt Activities by Public Officials," August 30-November 18, 1999.

Annotation

This paper reviews the mechanisms required to mount an effective effort to prevent and counter public corruption, with attention to the strategy of France's anti-corruption agency.

Abstract

The paper first reviews the international context that favors the anti-corruption fight, including the promotion of the "zero tolerance" approach by major international organizations; significant steps in the criminalization of corrupt behaviors; attempts to define an international concept of "public officials;" and attention to monitoring and evaluation processes. The paper then describes the "toolbox" approach as a systematic strategy for addressing corruption. This involves the use of expertise to "fine tune," "monitor," and provide directions for the use of warning indicators. The paper then considers the "Command-and-Control Paradigm" compared with the "Learning Organization Model." The Command-and-Control Paradigm supposes a top-down, hierarchical structure; whereas, the Learning Organization Model encourages reflection and inquiry among all members of the organization. These approaches can be complementary. A section on the evolution of the "whistleblowing" function suggests that the cultivation of individual "whistleblowing" (reporting acts of corruption to supervisors) is not as constructive as making an independent institution responsible for investigating and referring complaints that may be made anonymously. The paper then uses the French experience to support the need for specific authorities to be responsible for the prevention and repression of corruption, as it profiles the development, objectives, and operations of France's Service Central de Prevention de la Corruption. The paper concludes with a review of what was accomplished at the meeting of the Expert Group on Corruption and Its Financial Channels, held in Paris, France, March 30-April 1, 1999, which focused on means of addressing corruption through international cooperation in attacking money laundering, monitoring financial transactions, and developing rules for financial centers.