NCJ Number
137748
Journal
Vanderbilt Law Review Volume: 45 Issue: 4 Dated: (May 1992) Pages: 797-830
Date Published
1992
Length
34 pages
Annotation
This article critiques the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Teague v. Lane and projects its likely impact on lower Federal courts' habeas corpus jurisdiction and the development of interpretations of the due process clause of the U.S. Constitution.
Abstract
Ever since the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Allen (1953), the lower Federal courts have exercised their habeas corpus jurisdiction to define and enforce the demands of the due process clause. This article concludes that since the Court's decision in Teague v. Lane and its progeny, the habeas courts have been silenced. The Teague cases hold that in Federal habeas corpus proceedings, the lower Federal courts may not define the elements of fair criminal procedure beyond the parameters of clear U.S. Supreme Court pronouncements. This article first describes the rule and impact of the Teague cases and criticizes the disingenuous road the Court took to its decision. It then offers an alternative explanation of Teague. The author explains that just as the Supreme Court created habeas corpus jurisdiction for the very purpose of expanding and protecting due process rights, so the Court may constrict the availability of the writ if it perceives that the job of expanding rights is completed. The author then analyzes the hubris of a Court so confident that due process has been defined properly for all time, or even this time, that it is willing to shut the doors of habeas courts. 177 footnotes