NCJ Number
193289
Date Published
2000
Length
23 pages
Annotation
After reviewing the history of the movement to extend statutes of limitations for adult survivors of child sexual abuse (CSA), this chapter discusses the major issues currently being litigated and offers some suggestions for dealing with these issues.
Abstract
In the absence of a special statute of limitations for actions based on CSA, such actions are governed by the personal injury statute of limitations of the State whose law governs the action. Because most victims of CSA do not become aware of their long-term psychological injuries, or of the causal connection between the earlier abuse and those injuries, until sometime in their 20's or 30's, they would be barred from suing before they had a reasonable chance to do so, unless they could invoke an additional exception to the "running" of the statute. To date, 31 States have enacted special statutes of limitation applicable to actions based on CSA. Twenty-six of these statutes provide that the limitations period does not begin to run until the plaintiff has in some manner "discovered" the injury or the causal connection between the injury and the earlier abuse; 5 States simply provide an extended number of years beyond the date of plaintiff's majority in which to begin legal actions. Among the 20 States (including the District of Columbia) with no CSA statute, 7 have applied discovery accrual to at least some adult survivor actions, and 2 have fashioned limited exceptions on other grounds. Where discovery accrual has been applied, one of the most litigated issues has been whether it should be applied only where the plaintiff had completely "repressed" the incidents of abuse until a date within the statutory period ("Type 2" discovery); or should it also be applied where the plaintiff had always had some knowledge or recollection of the abuse but had been delayed in being able to recognize that the abuse was causally connected to his/her adult psychological injuries until a date within the statutory period ("Type 1" discovery). The chapter recommends that practitioners representing Type 1 plaintiffs should put evidence before the court regarding the unique characteristics of CSA that give rise to and thus justify the delay in bringing suit. 66 notes