ILLEGAL CORPORATE BEHAVIOR

• NCJ Number: 57893
• Author(s): M B CLINARD; P C YEAGER; J BRISSETTE; D PETRASHEK; E HARRIES
• Date Published: 1979
• Length: 348 pages
• Grant Number(s): 77-NI-99-0069
• Sponsoring Agency: US Dept of Justice; US Dept of Justice NIJ Pub
• Corporate Author: University of Wisconsin
• Sale Source: Superintendent of Documents, GPO; National Institute of Justice/
• Language: English
• Country: United States of America

Annotation

FOCUSING ON SEVERAL HUNDRED MAJOR CORPORATIONS, THIS STUDY REPRESENTS THE FIRST LARGE-SCALE, COMPREHENSIVE INVESTIGATION OF CORPORATIONS FOR ACTIONS THAT VIOLATE THE LAW.

Abstract

ALTHOUGH THE EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION CONCENTRATED ON 582 OF THE LARGEST PUBLICLY OWNED CORPORATIONS IN THE U.S., THE MAJOR FOCUS WAS ON MANUFACTURING FIRMS WHOSE ANNUAL SALES (1975) RANGED FROM $300 MILLION TO MORE THAN $45 BILLION, WITH AN AVERAGE SALES VOLUME OF $1.7 BILLION. THE STUDY DATA COVERED ALL OBTAINABLE ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS INITIATED OR IMPOSED BY 24 FEDERAL AGENCIES DURING 1975 AND 1976. THE DATA REVEAL A WIDE RANGE OF CORPORATE VIOLATIONS. PREDICTIONS OF VIOLATIONS ARE ATTEMPTED THROUGH ANALYSES OFTEN USED TO COMPARE INDUSTRY-LEVEL AND ECONOMY-LEVEL DATA. THESE DATA SHOW THAT UNFAVORABLE TRENDS IN SALES, PROFITS, EARNINGS, AND PRODUCT DIVERSIFICATION ARE ASSOCIATED WITH VIOLATIONS. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS IS PRESENTED OF THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THOSE CORPORATIONS AGAINST WHICH LIMITED ACTIONS HAVE BEEN INITIATED AND THOSE AGAINST WHICH ACTIONS HAVE BEEN EXTENSIVE. TO TEST THE VIEW THAT PRESSURES FROM PARENT CORPORATIONS TO INCREASE PROFITS CONTRIBUTE TO GREATER VIOLATIONS BY SUBSIDIARIES, ACTIONS AGAINST PARENT CORPORATIONS ARE COMPARED WITH ACTIONS AGAINST THEIR 101 LARGEST SUBSIDIARIES, WHOSE 1976 SALES RANGED FROM $300 MILLION TO $7.8 BILLION. AN ANALYSIS IS PROVIDED OF THE METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS IN STUDYING CORPORATE CRIME AND THE INADEQUACY OF FEDERAL STATUTES ON CORPORATE CRIME. OTHER TOPICS DISCUSSED ARE CORPORATE ORGANIZATION AND CORPORATE CRIME, REGULATORY AGENCIES AND FEDERAL AND STATE RELATIONS IN CONTROLLING CORPORATE CRIME, CORPORATE ANTITRUST AND ILLEGAL PAYMENTS VIOLATIONS, CORPORATE EXECUTIVES AND CRIMINAL LIABILITY, AND THE CONTROL OF CORPORATE CRIME. TABULAR DATA AND REFERENCES ARE PROVIDED. (AUTHOR ABSTRACT MODIFIED)