Impact of Collective Bargaining and Interest Arbitration on Policing - Executive Summary

• NCJ Number: 92684
• Author(s): P Feuille; W Hendricks; J T Delaney
• Date Published: 1983
• Length: 46 pages
• Grant Number(s): 81-IJ-CX-0074
• Sponsoring Agency: National Institute of Justice (NIJ); US Dept of Justice NIJ Pub
• Corporate Author: University of Illinois
• Sale Source: National Institute of Justice/; NCJRS Photocopy Services
• Language: English
• Country: United States of America

Annotation

This report summarizes results from a national study of the impact of arbitration and collective bargaining upon police salaries and benefits, and upon police department employment, crime rates, and clearance rates.

Abstract

Both collective bargaining and the availability of interest arbitration are clearly associated with higher salaries, greater fringe benefits, and contracts more favorable to the union. Somewhat less clear is whether bargaining, and especially arbitration, caused these higher salaries, benefits, and more favorable contracts. The findings indicate that, controlling for availability of arbitration, use of arbitration does not lead to a long-term union advantage compared to unions that did not use arbitration. Bargaining is associated with employment of more civilians in police departments; arbitration results in more officers in the departments. Bargaining also correlates with lower reported crime rates. There is no such association with arbitration. Higher police department expenditures result from both bargaining and arbitration. It is unclear as to whether bargaining and arbitration actually caused these changes. Statistical tables provided. (Author summary modified)