NCJ Number
74858
Journal
Urban Studies Volume: 16 Dated: (February 1979) Pages: 105-112
Date Published
1979
Length
8 pages
Annotation
This paper presents a methodology for calculating the property tax revenue lost to a city due to an intolerably high crime level which causes bid rents for residential units in the city to decrease.
Abstract
The methodology assumes that the city is circular with employment in the central business district, that transportation costs depend only on distance traveled, and that households make a fixed number of trips to the central district per unit of time and receive identical incomes. Other assumptions are that housing is a homogenous commodity and that individuals have identical preferences. The model does provide the basis for a cost-revenue analysis for city police expenditures. While the figures presented are suggestive, in order for a completely accurate analysis to be performed, it is necessary to have information on police production functions and more refined information on construction of a crime index. Construction of an accurate index of the severity of the crime problem requires information on how perceptions of the degree of seriousness are formed (through the media or via Federal of Bureau of Investigation rates). Related to the question of how crime perceptions are formed is the question of how crime affects utility (profit) levels. Whether violent crimes or property crimes are more important may vary with land-use category. The study focuses on residential land users where the evidence suggests that crimes against property are more significant. The model can be extended to include commercial users. Here the disutility of different crimes may vary across land use so that the structure of relative bid rents would be altered and land-use proportions thereby would be adjusted. In addition, other categories of crime may be important in the utility function, such as prostitution and other victimless crimes. If they are not, resources spent in efforts to decrease these activities may be misallocated (such as police manpower). The paper presents an example of Boston's aggregate tax loss at a given crime level. Tables, footnotes, and a list of 14 references are included.