Implied Consent: Minnesota's Twist on the Constitutional Right to Counsel in DWI Proceedings: Friedman v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 473 N.W.2d 828(Minn. 1991)

• NCJ Number: 138546
• Journal: Hamline Law Review Volume: 15 Issue: 1 Dated: (Fall 1991) Pages: 195-222
• Author(s): B S Schafer
• Date Published: 1992
• Length: 28 pages
• Publication Format: Article
• Publication Type: Legislation/Policy Analysis
• Language: English
• Country: United States of America

Annotation

This analysis of the Minnesota Supreme Court decision in Friedman v. Commissioner of Public Safety concludes that the court's decision was improper and that persons suspected of drunk driving should not have the right to consult with an attorney before submitting to a chemical test to determine intoxication.

Abstract

In the Friedman case, a police officer investigating a traffic accident observed that Friedman exhibited signs of intoxication. He asked Friedman to submit to a preliminary breath test. Friedman consented to the test and failed. Later, at the police department's chemical testing room, she refused to take a second chemical test. Her refusal resulted in an immediate 1-year license revocation and a criminal charge of driving while intoxicated. The Supreme Court overturned the Court of Appeals decision, holding that administering a chemical test occurs at a critical stage of a criminal prosecution and that the defendant therefore has a limited right to counsel before deciding whether to submit to this testing. However, this stage is important but not critical. This decision provides drivers suspected of drunk driving special treatment given no other criminal arrestees by allowing them to demand a right to counsel before submitting to procedures to gather evidence. This decision did not conform to established principles of constitutional law or developed case authority. Footnotes