NCJ Number
138458
Journal
Cornell Law Review Volume: 77 Issue: 3 Dated: (March 1992) Pages: 612-649
Date Published
1992
Length
38 pages
Annotation
This note argues that current judicial deference to administrative rules that define criminal conduct under certain statutes are inappropriate, because the policies that underlie such judicial deference are of diluted force and are outweighed by policies peculiar to criminal law.
Abstract
The jurisprudential foundation for modern administrative law maintains that agencies only follow the instructions, however general, given to them by Congress. The modern approach of judicial deference in the review of administrative interpretations of congressional legislation ignores the courts' role in monitoring this delegation by allowing agencies to determine the parameters of their own powers. Such deference is inappropriate in the context of regulations that define criminal conduct. The policies that support judicial deference in general--recognition of expertise and the favoring of policy determinations of executive agencies over courts--are of lesser significance when criminal prosecutions are involved. Moreover, a host of special concerns for criminal defendants are at issue in the context of administrative crimes. In recognition of these concerns, courts should use a de novo standard of review whenever the validity of administratively defined criminal penalties is challenged. 273 footnotes