NCJ Number
109348
Journal
International Journal of the Sociology of Law Volume: 16 Issue: 1 Dated: (February 1988) Pages: 91-101
Date Published
1988
Length
11 pages
Annotation
This paper argues that discussions of organized crime have paid insufficient attention to how illegal markets operate in the absence of state support for contracts and property ownership and uses the squatter property market in Hong Kong to illustrate processes that regulate exchange relationships in illegal markets.
Abstract
A review of the literature on organized crime concludes that the extensionist hypothesis -- that organized crime is inextricably linked to capitalism and the electoral systems of democratic countries -- has some validity, but often neglects mechanisms which make extension possible. A description of Hong Kong's illegal squatter property market identifies three factors influencing its organization: structure of government control, the nature of the illegal activities, and the characteristics and organizations of those involved. Individual interests of squatters are not enough by themselves to result in an informally regulated property market. Mechanisms are required to replace the state's role, and these are made possible by the community's social organization in conjunction with its political organs and traditional conceptions of tenure. 18 references.