NCJ Number
114942
Journal
Valparaiso University Law Review Volume: 21 Issue: 3 Dated: (Spring 1987) Pages: 497-525
Date Published
1987
Length
29 pages
Annotation
This discussion considers the historical development, since the Miranda decision in 1966, of the legal concepts -- compulsion, fundamental fairness, estoppel, impeachment -- that apparently determine the use that may constitutionally be made of a defendant's words and behavior surrounding the Miranda warnings.
Abstract
A criminal defendant who pleads not guilty by reason of insanity is afforded every opportunity to present his case with virtually no limits on evidence admissibility. The prosecution's presentation of evidence of sanity, however, has been unfairly curtailed. In Wainwright v. Greenfield, a somewhat ambiguous opinion, the U.S. Supreme Court has arguably decided to exclude from evidence a defendant's lucid responses to Miranda warnings given immediately after the crime. Defendant's postarrest behavior, even if connected with the Miranda warnings, should be admissible under Harris v. New York and Oregon v. Hass to impeach an assertion of insanity at the time of the Miranda warnings. Under such a rule, defendant could not use Miranda as a shield to prevent confrontation with prior inconsistent behavior. Alternatively, if impeachment use of behavior otherwise protected by the Miranda warnings is deemed undesirable, symmetry would be maintained by excluding evidence of defendant's statements as relayed by the psychiatrist. 138 footnotes.