NCJ Number
97034
Journal
Law and Contemporary Problems Volume: 46 Issue: 4 Dated: (Autumn 1983) Pages: 269-281
Date Published
1983
Length
13 pages
Annotation
This article argues that the propriety of using particular statistical evidence in jury selection cases cannot be assessed adequately without distinguishing between challenges based on the equal protection clause and those based on the constitutional or statutory right to a jury drawn from a fair cross section of the community.
Abstract
The fundamental issue in jury selection cases involving statistical proof, deciding what comparisons are probative, is addressed. In many cases, the U.S. Supreme Court and the lower courts have allowed the defendant to compare the percentage of minority jurors with the percentage of minority persons in the general population. However, in recent years some courts have accepted the prosecution's argument that the proper comparison is between the percentage of minority jurors and the percentage of minorities among the population eligible for jury service; eligible population figures have been required in both equal protection and fair cross section cases. Further, the courts are divided on the proper method of analyzing the data in jury selection and composition cases. Most courts use the absolute disparity standard, which has several limitations, including its insensitivity to the size of the group involved. Other approaches have been suggested, including the comparative disparity approach, the absolute impact standard, and the standard deviance analysis; advantages and disadvantages of each method are noted. Finally, the last issue raised by cases involving a statistical proof of disparity -- how great a disparity must be to establish a prima facie case -- is considered. Eighty-three references are listed.