NCJ Number
215588
Journal
Crime, Law & Social Change Volume: 44 Issue: 4-5 Dated: 2005 Pages: 387-422
Date Published
2005
Length
36 pages
Annotation
This article analyzes the inherent difficulties of relying on intelligence information as a basis for action, with a focus on intelligence and anti-terrorism legislation in the United Kingdom.
Abstract
Both criminalization (anti-terrorism legislation and policing) and control strategies (intelligence gathering) of counter-terrorism have been widely viewed as detrimental to the rule of law, particularly in terms of individual rights. In the United Kingdom, the overarching counter-terrorism strategy determined by the government focuses on prevention and preparation (control strategies). Indeed, there has been a growing emphasis on intelligence-led policing as a core police activity even outside the domain of counter-terrorism. However, the inherent difficulties of using intelligence as a basis for action have plagued professional policing institutions. This problem is exacerbated when the ultimate decisionmaking falls into the hands of politically motivated and often inexperienced government officials rather than detached and informed judges. Two examples of UK legislation are examined in this respect: exclusion and detention without trial. These two pieces of legislation are examined in terms of why it was necessary to rely on intelligence in these cases, the quality of the intelligence, the processes involved in the use of intelligence, and whether the intelligence was thoroughly examined. The author argues that first, intelligence is a proper basis for legal action and second, that further regulation is both needed and possible to regulate how intelligence is made actionable, particularly in the context of executive orders based on intelligence. Intelligence regulations should focus on providing guidelines about targeting groups or individuals for intelligence operations and should provide a definition of what constitutes valid, quality intelligence. Oversight should be provided for the processes of intelligence gathering, use, storage, and dissemination and legal outcomes based on intelligence information must be carefully considered. Finally, a system for continuous legislative and executive oversight of intelligence and its use should be mandated, perhaps in the form of a specialist standing committee that reports to Parliament rather than just the Home Secretary. 192 notes