Introduction to the New South Wales Independent Commission Against Corruption (From Annual Report for 2005 and Resource Material Series No. 69, P 202-226, 2006, Simon Cornell, ed. -- See NCJ-217726)

• NCJ Number: 217734
• Author(s): John Pritchard
• Date Published: July 2006
• Length: 25 pages
• Sale Source: United Nations Asia and Far East Institute for the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders
• Publication Format: Article
• Publication Type: Legislation/Policy Description
• Language: English
• Country: Japan

Annotation

This article describes the development, functions, jurisdiction, and powers of the New South Wales (Australia) Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC).

Abstract

The ICAC was developed in 1988 to confront widespread public corruption in New South Wales. The ICAC currently has a budget of $16.45 million and employs a staff of 118 individuals who are divided among the ICAC’s 5 sections: the Strategic Operations Division; the Corruption Prevention, Education and Research Division; the Legal Division; the Corporate Services Division; and Assessments. During its 15 years of operation, the ICAC has received over 25,000 complaints or reports and during its latest financial year (2003-2004), it received 1,884 complaints or reports of corruption. In addition to investigations, the ICAC also undertakes significant corruption prevention and education work, including state-wide train-the-trainer programs, awareness campaigns, and informative publications. The principal functions of the ICAC, which are set out in Section 13 of the ICAC Act, are identified and include investigations, education, the formulation of recommendations, and cooperation with public authorities. Additional ICAC functions are set out in Section 14 of the ICAC Act and include assembling and describing evidence and providing the information to the proper authority. Definitions of corrupt conduct are set out in Sections 8 and 9 of the ICAC Act. These definitions are broad and cover a wide range of conduct that is not necessarily criminal, such as dishonesty and the improper use of information. The jurisdiction of the ICAC extends only to “public officials” and “public authorities,” which may include government businesses, outsourced government functions, and members of parliament. The ICAC has extensive and coercive powers that are considered essential to its performance, such as the power to obtain information, the power to enter public premises, and the power to conduct hearings. In closing, the author notes that the success of the ICAC in New South Wales has been linked to its dual role of corruption investigation and prevention. Footnotes