NCJ Number
84496
Date Published
1981
Length
78 pages
Annotation
The impediments to fairness imposed by joint trials should be weighed case by case against a realistic assessment of the benefits of joinder rather than continuing the present blind preference for joint trials and the correlative barriers to severance.
Abstract
While the substantive criminal law scrupulously honors the principle of individual responsibility, that principle is jeopardized in a joint trial of two or more defendants. Statutes or decisions in virtually all American jurisdictions permit joinder of defendants charged with the same offense, with different offenses committed in furtherance of a common conspiracy, or with different offenses arising from the same transaction, episode, or series of transactions or episodes. After joinder, separation is possible; however, trial courts order separate trials only upon a showing of substantial prejudice to the defendant, and appellate courts reverse a denial of severance only for abuse of discretion. The law has thus created a strong presumption that defendants joined together should be tried together. The strongest justification traditionally offered for joint trials is efficiency. Courts, however, have greatly exaggerated the supposed efficiencies of joint trials while grossly underestimating the impediments joint trials pose to fair and accurate determinations of individual guilt or innocence. Joint trials usually help the prosecutor gain convictions and thereby modify the balance of advantage in criminal trials. A case-by-case weighing of impediments to fairness in relation to the benefits of efficiency would help to ensure that a defendant's rights are not compromised in joint trials. A total of 265 footnotes are provided. (Author summary modified)