Judging Police Performance - Views and Behavior of Patrol Officers (From Police at Work, P 65-86, 1983, Richard R Bennett, ed. - See NCJ-89673)

• NCJ Number: 89676
• Author(s): D N Allen; M G Maxfield
• Date Published: 1983
• Length: 22 pages
• Sponsoring Agency: Indiana University
• Sale Source: Sage Publications, Inc
• Language: English
• Country: United States of America

Annotation

After discussing the problems inherent in police supervision, the authors analyze data collected from over 150 patrol officers and their supervisors in the Louisville Police Department (Kentucky) to demonstrate the effectiveness of the bargaining model of supervision over the command model.

Abstract

Many characteristics of the policing environment inhibit supervision, such as confusion about intended purposes, contradictory preferences of police managers and the community, the lack of positive incentives, and the individualistic police officer personality. In contrast to the traditional command model, the bargaining approach acknowledges police officers' independence from supervisory control and proposes that successful supervisors work with the few positive incentives available, such as dismissing an officer a few hours early, although this may violate departmental rules. To gather empirical data on supervisory practices, this study reviewed departmental records and interviewed 14 sergeants, 11 lieutenants, and 152 patrol officers from the Louisville police during summer 1981. The most frequent response from officers when asked about performance measures their supervisors used was quantity of work, followed by work characteristics/habits. Over two-thirds of the supervisors believed their performance measures were good. Wide variations between officers and supervisors regarding the importance of quantity of work existed in most districts, suggesting that supervisors were reluctant to mention this indicator. Supervisors' emphasis on quantity had a slight negative association with officers' self-rating. Finally, officer arrest behavior did not appear influenced by supervisory emphasis on quantity of work. These findings support the bargaining model assumption that officers have few problems evading supervisory demands. Alternative approaches include emphasizing positive incentives such as career development strategies and providing supervisors with the flexibility to create positive inducements that respond to individual situations. Tables, 7 footnotes, and 40 references are included.