Judging in Trial Courts - An Exploratory Study

• NCJ Number: 70999
• Journal: Journal of Politics Volume: 39 Issue: 2 Dated: (1977) Pages: 368-398
• Author(s): A Sarat
• Date Published: 1980
• Length: 31 pages
• Publication Format: Article
• Publication Type: Report (Study/Research)
• Language: English
• Country: United States of America

Annotation

Results of a study focusing on State trial judges in Wisconsin are discussed. Their attitudes and behavior are described in terms of incentive theory and the motivational basis of political participation.

Abstract

Trial judges are among the least studied and least well understood of all political actors. This inattention is partially attributable to the judges' low visibility, the difficulty of gathering information on behavior, and the difficulty of determining the focus of activities worthy of study. In this study, data were derived from personal interviews conducted with 48 Wisconsin County court judges during 1972. All judges serve on the basic trial courts of general jurisdiction in Wisconsin, handling both civil and criminal cases. Six incentive types were identified: adulation, status, program, mission, obligation, and game. Among the judges interviewed only the second, third, fifth, and sixth incentive type were present. The most prevalent of the displayed incentives in this sample is the game incentive. Of the 48 judges interviewed, 18 fell into this category. These judges are activity-oriented and derive satisfaction from judicial activities and behaviors because they associate them with particular substantive results. Fourteen judges are classified as program judges; they enjoy learning about issues and solving specific problems. The primary orientation of the status judge is internal; he derives satisfaction from the prestige and status associated with the office and is motivated by a desire to prove himself to be a worthwhile individual. The obligation type seeks to fulfill a sense of duty and sees political office as providing a chance to engage in ethically proper action. In contrast to the friendly demeanor of game judges, both program and obligation judges tend to be formal and businesslike in their courtroom decorum. Incentive theory provides one framework for understanding the motivations which guide judicial behavior. Footnotes and tables are provided.