NCJ Number
44826
Journal
American Criminal Law Review Volume: 15 Issue: 1 Dated: (SUMMER 1977) Pages: 63-86
Date Published
1977
Length
24 pages
Annotation
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT RULING IN STONE V. POWELL FOR INTERPRETATION OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE AND FOR FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS JURISDICTION IS ANALYZED.
Abstract
DURING THE SEARCH INCIDENT TO POWELL'S ARREST FOR VAGRANCY IN NEVADA, POLICE FOUND A GUN THAT IMPLICATED POWELL IN A MURDER COMMITTED IN CALIFORNIA. AT TRIAL IN CALIFORNIA, POWELL TRIED TO HAVE TESTIMONY ABOUT THE GUN'S DISCOVERY EXCLUDED ON THE GROUND THAT THE ORDINANCE UNDER WHICH HE HAD BEEN ARRESTED WAS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE, THEREBY RENDERING THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH INVALID. THE TRIAL COURT REJECTED THIS CONTENTION AND CONVICTED POWELL. THE STATE COURT OF APPEAL AFFIRMED THE CONVICTION, FINDING THAT THE ERROR, IF ANY, IN ADMITTING THE CHALLENGING TESTIMONY WAS HARMLESS. POWELL'S ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN STATE HABEAS CORPUS RELIEF WAS DENIED, AS WAS HIS FIRST PETITION FOR FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS RELIEF. LATER THE NIGHTH CIRCUIT REVERSED THE DISTRICT COURT'S DENIAL, FINDING THAT THE VAGRANCY ORDINANCE WAS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE, THAT THE ARREST WAS UNLAWFUL, THAT THE TESTIMONY SHOULD HAVE BEEN EXCLUDED, AND THAT THE ADMISSION OF THE TESTIMONY WAS NOT HARMLESS. REVIEWING THIS AND A COMPARISON CASE ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI, THE U.S. SUPREME COURT REVERSED THE CIRCUIT COURTS. INSTEAD OF DECIDING WHETHER THE EVIDENCE USED TO CONVICT THE PETITIONERS HAD BEEN UNLAWFULLY OBTAINED, THE COURT HELD THAT FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS RELIEF SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED BECAUSE THE STATE COURTS HAD PROVIDED AN OPPORTUNITY FOR 'FULL AND FAIR LITIGATION' OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT CLAIM REGARDING THE ADMISSIBILITY OF THE GUN TESTIMONY. IT IS SUGGESTED THAT, IN ITS DECISION, THE COURT CURTAILED FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS JURISDICTION WITHOUT ADEQUATE EXPLANATION AND PROPER REASONING, AND FAILED TO ADDRESS FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES PRESENTED IN THE CASE. IT IS POINTED OUT THAT THE COURT OPTED FOR THE DETERRENCE RATIONALE RATHER THAN THE JUDICIAL RATIONALE TO EXPLAIN THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE, AND IN SO DOING VIOLATED ITS OWN GENERAL FORMULATIONS OF JUDICIAL INTEGRITY AND THE APPEARANCE OF JUSTICE. CONSIDERATION OF THE LONG-RANGE IMPLICATIONS OF THE STONE DECISION POINTS UP THE POSSIBILITY THAT, ALTHOUGH THE COURT MAY HAVE HOPED THAT ITS CURBING OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE WOULD CAUSE THE PUBLIC TO HOLD JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN GREATER ESTEEM, THE END RESULT MAY BE THE LOSS OF BROADER RESPECT FOR THE ENTIRE LEGAL SYSTEM.