NCJ Number
170796
Journal
New England Journal on Criminal and Civil Confinement Volume: 23 Issue: 2 Dated: (Summer 1997) Pages: 529-558
Date Published
1997
Length
30 pages
Annotation
This Comment analyzes the decision by the State of Massachusetts to expand the Pearce principle into its common law notwithstanding that the US Supreme Court is limiting its scope.
Abstract
The doctrine known as the Pearce principle holds that, whenever a judge imposes a more severe sentence upon a defendant after a new trial, the reasons for doing so must be based upon objective information concerning the identifiable conduct on the part of the defendant. If the judge does not so justify the increased sentence, this error creates the presumption that vindictiveness motivated the increased sentence. The Comment concludes that the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court erred in expanding the Pearce principle into its common law. Moreover, the need for sentencing discretion outweighs the benefits of adopting a presumption of judicial vindictiveness when a different judge imposes the second sentence. The Comment traces the development of the Pearce presumption of judicial vindictiveness. It also studies the development of the law and the underlying policies in order to understand the shortcomings of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts decision in Commonwealth v. Hyatt. The Comment discusses the facts and judgment in Hyatt, and evaluates the court's rationale. Notes