NCJ Number
87476
Journal
Fordham Law Review Volume: 50 Issue: 1 Dated: (October 1981) Pages: 30-60
Date Published
1981
Length
31 pages
Annotation
Rules which unnecessarily or excessively limit voir dire imperil the presumption of innocence by creating an implication of guilt and derogate a defendant's right to an impartial jury by not making available to the defense juror information known to the prosecution.
Abstract
The presumption of innocence and the right to trial by an impartial jury, hallmarks of the American criminal justice system, have been substantially restricted in recent Federal court decisions. In Bell v. Wolfish, the Supreme Court held that the presumption of innocence has no application in determining the rights of pretrial detainees. In Kentucky v. Whorton, the Supreme Court ruled that a charge addressing the presumption of innocence need not always be given to a jury prior to its deliberations. Further, In United States v. Barnes, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a trial judge's sua sponte instruction to potential jurors not to reveal their identities and his preclusion of defense counsel from inquiring on voir dire as to a juror's street address and religious and ethnic background. In so holding, the court not only further derogated a defendant's right to a jury trial by substantially restricting the scope and meaning of voir dire but dealt a blow to the presumption of innocence before the presentation of any evidence. Threats to juror safety, whether emanating from volatile factions in society, must be countered; however, only in those rare cases where the prosecution can show that no effective alternative to anonymity exists should a trial judge be permitted to severely limit voir dire by withholding the names and street addresses of prospective jurors from the defense. A total of 148 footnotes is provided.