Law and the Human Target in Information Warfare: Cautions and Opportunities (From CyberWar 3.0: Human Factors in Information Operations and Future Conflict, P 137-151, 2000, Alan D. Campen, Douglas H. Dearth, eds, -- See NCJ-191421)

• NCJ Number: 191427
• Author(s): Charles J. Dunlap Jr.
• Date Published: 2000
• Length: 15 pages
• Sale Source: AFCEA International Press (AIP)
• Publication Format: Book Chapter
• Publication Type: Legislation/Policy Analysis
• Language: English
• Country: United States of America

Annotation

This essay examines the current state of the law as it applies to the use of Information Warfare (IW) methodologies against the human target.

Abstract

All warfare, including IW is essentially a contest of wills between the living. Information is the key to the mental interaction that underlies human conflict. The human target is the most lucrative target in virtually all wars. The communications revolution is increasingly providing the masses with real-time access to information from war zones. The public now has the ability to easily monitor the conduct of their militaries, uncensored by government handlers through a technology-empowered media. Given the centrality of information in modern conflicts, it is imperative that decision-makers understand the importance of observing the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC). Warfare advocates need to be aware of what the law does or does not permit. LOAC, like most international law, applies to relations between nations. One of the most basic principles of LOAC is that the “rights of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited.” There are other basic concepts that apply to the human target in IW, just as they do to other targets in more conventional conflicts. These include the principles of discrimination and proportionality. Discrimination requires the means or method of warfare to distinguish between combatants and noncombatant persons and objects. Proportionality requires that the collateral damage to noncombatants or their property not be disproportionate in relation to the “concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.” Even if a particular information operation targeting a human being might bring a given conflict to an early termination, its execution is still forbidden if it violates LOAC. When the human target is a noncombatant, then attacks for the sole purpose of eroding their life support system are impermissible, regardless of the methodology employed. Cyber-warriors should consider that attacks against dual-use infrastructure might undermine the public support that is part of sustaining a war. 78 endnotes