Law, Fact and Lay Questions (From Criminal Law and Justice: Essays from the W.G. Hart Workshop, 1986, P 59-72, 1987, I H Dennis, ed. -- See NCJ-118520)

• NCJ Number: 118521
• Author(s): S F D Guest
• Date Published: 1987
• Length: 14 pages
• Sale Source: Sweet and Maxwell
• Publication Type: Legislation/Policy Analysis
• Language: English
• Country: United Kingdom
• Note: *This document is currently unavailable from NCJRS.

Annotation

This analysis of the distinction in British criminal justice between questions of law and questions of fact and of its implications for the role of the judge and the role of the jury argues that a more useful approach would be to distinguish between lay questions and lawyer questions.

Abstract

A major problem with the word "fact" is its suggestion of the existence of a counterpart to language in the real world. However, facts are closely connected with language and its interpretation. Thus, ordinary words like "recklessly" or "dishonest" are subject to varying interpretations by a jury. Such words do not usually have a single clear meaning in relation to the subject matter of a dispute, so characterizing their application as questions of fact will produce controversial conclusions. It should be the judge's responsibility to interpret the law and tell the jury what is envisioned by a particular law, rather than leaving the jury to decide whether the kind of conduct amounts to dishonesty. Notes.