NCJ Number
93800
Journal
Law and Society Review Volume: 15 Issue: 3-4 Dated: (1980-81) Pages: 567-610,883-910
Date Published
1981
Length
72 pages
Annotation
This article explores economic determinants of lawyer behavior which in turn shape basic decisions affecting their clients in such areas as whether to file litigation, how much discovery to employ, whether to accept a settlement offer, and the like.
Abstract
Three methods of compensating lawyers are identified: fee-for-service, contingent-fee, and third-party payment. It is hypothesized that each of these methods creates very different configurations of economic incentives, some of which conflict with the best interests of clients. The possibilities for maximizing various of these economic goals are discussed along with the limits -- economic and noneconomic -- on such behavior. Finally, the article suggests some potential applications of this analysis for public policy and further research. (Publisher abstract)