NCJ Number
155613
Journal
Law and Society Review Volume: 27 Issue: 4 Dated: (1993) Pages: 741-783
Date Published
1993
Length
43 pages
Annotation
This analysis of the development of organizational probation, which judges can impose on corporations and other organizations convicted of crimes, notes that this sanction is unexpected in that it represents an interventionist, nonmarket sanction developed during a time of deregulatory free-market policy and ideology.
Abstract
Organizational probation emerged from the long process of developing organizational sentencing guidelines as a clearly specified, widely available, and often-binding sanction. This outcome is explained through a multi- theoretical framework emphasizing the structural capacity of the primary lawmaking agency, the United States Sentencing Commission, the role of middle-level government workers, and the bounded rationality of strategic decisions made by business strategists and lobbyists. The development of this sanction points to the diversity of government personnel involved in lawmaking and the limitations they experience in pursuing their interests. Although enforcement remains uncertain, what has been accomplished over the past 25 years marks a change in the legal approach to corporate crime control and will inevitably have some effect on corporations and the courts. Footnotes, case and law citations, and 191 references (Author abstract modified)