NCJ Number
53291
Journal
Police Magazine Volume: 2 Issue: 1 Dated: (JANUARY 1979) Pages: 34-44
Date Published
1979
Length
11 pages
Annotation
LOOTING THAT OCCURRED IN THE 1977 NEW YORK CITY BLACKOUT FOCUSED ATTENTION ON OFFICERS IN THE LARGEST POLICE DEPARTMENT OF THE COUNTRY AND DEMONSTRATED POLICE LIMITATIONS IN DEALING WITH THE CRISIS.
Abstract
UNDER A GRANT FROM THE FORD FOUNDATIONS, TWO JOURNALISTS SPENT 5 MONTHS INTERVIEWING CITY OFFICIALS, POLICE OFFICERS, MERCHANTS, LOOTERS, COMMUNITY LEADERS, AND LOCAL RESIDENTS AFTER THE BLACKOUT. LOOTING ATTRACTED PEOPLE FROM POOR NEIGHBORHOODS AND SEEMED TO BE DIVIDED INTO THREE STAGES: (1) LOOTERS FROM 9:30 P.M. UNTIL ABOUT 10:30 OR 11:00 P.M. WERE PRIMARILY CRIME-PRONE ROOTLESS MALES BETWEEN 20 AND 30 YEARS OF AGE WHO SYSTEMATICALLY ROBBED STORES OF THE MOST VALUABLE MERCHANDISE; (2) BANDS OF YOUTH AND THE UNEMPLOYED AND UNEDUCATED GHETTO POOR UNDER 35 YEARS OF AGE MOVED INTO THE LOOTING SCENE ONCE STORES WERE OPENED; AND (3) AFTER MIDNIGHT AND THROUGH THE NEXT AFTERNOON, USUALLY LAW-ABIDING POOR AND WORKING CLASS MEMBERS OF THE COMMUNITY BECAME INVOLVED. LOOTING WAS NONPOLITICAL, FAIRLY SELECTIVE, AND LIMITED TO LARGE STORES IN COMMERCIAL AREAS THAT SOLD FOOD, CLOTHING, OR EASILY FENCED GOODS. AS IN THE LOOTING, DISTINCT LEVELS OF POLICE RESPONSE OCCURRED. THE FIRST LEVEL LASTED 2 OR 3 HOURS AFTER THE LIGHTS WENT OUT WHEN POLICE COULD DO LITTLE WITH INADEQUATE MANPOWER. THE SECOND LEVEL BEGAN ABOUT 12:30 A.M. WHEN POLICE STARTED MAKING A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF ARRESTS. THE SPONTANEITY IN THE OUTBREAK OF LOOTING, ALONG WITH THE ABSENCE OF STRONG INITIAL POLICE ACTION, CREATED A FEELING OF IMMUNITY FROM ARREST AMONG LOOTERS. THE DELAY IN MAKING ARRESTS UNTIL EARLY MORNING MEANT THAT PERSONS WHO PROFITED MOST FROM LOOTING STOOD THE LEAST CHANCE OF GOING TO JAIL. THE PEAK PERIOD FOR ARRESTS WAS BETWEEN 1:30 AND 2:30 A.M.. THERE WERE ONLY 3,428 OFFICERS ON DUTY AT THE TIME OF THE BLACKOUT. POLICE STRENGTH INCREASED SHARPLY WITHIN THE FIRST 2 HOURS, BUT IT WAS NOT UNTIL NOON THE NEXT DAY THAT MAXIMUM STRENGTH WAS REACHED. ONE OF THE MORE EFFECTIVE STRATEGIES USED BY POLICE, WHO WERE HIGHLY OUTNUMBERED BY LOOTERS, WAS TO ENTER A BLOCK FROM BOTH ENDS TO CATCH LOOTERS IN THE MIDDLE. PRECINCTS WERE EQUIPPED WITH POLAROID CAMERAS, ENABLING A CLERK TO SNAP A PICTURE OF BOTH PATROL OFFICER AND ARRESTEE SO THE OFFICER COULD GET BACK ON THE STREETS. A MAJOR REASON FOR THE SHORTAGE OF OFFICERS WAS THE DEPARTMENT'S DIFFICULTY IN CALLING IN OFF-DUTY PERSONNEL. ANOTHER ASPECT OF POLICE CONDUCT AFFECTING THE EXTENT OF LOOTING WAS GENERALLY STRICT ADHERENCE TO DEPARTMENT REGULATIONS PROHIBITING THE FIRING OF REVOLVERS UNLESS AN OFFICER'S LIFE OR SOMEONE ELSE'S LIFE IS IN DANGER, WHICH DID PREVENT LOOTING FROM ESCALATING INTO A DISORDER INVOLVING SERIOUS VIOLENCE. MEASURES THAT COULD HAVE IMPROVED POLICE HANDLING OF THE BLACKOUT, INCLUDING THE USE OF MORE POLICE OFFICERS, CALLING IN THE NATIONAL GUARD, USING MASSIVE DOSES OF TEAR GAS, AND USING FIRE DEPARTMENT HOSES AS WEAPONS TO CLEAR THE STREETS OF PEOPLE, ARE DISCUSSED. (DEP)