NCJ Number
79159
Journal
University of Pennsylvania Law Review Volume: 123 Dated: (1974) Pages: 258-296
Date Published
1974
Length
39 pages
Annotation
This article examines legal doctrines which distinguish between the criminally insane and the general criminal population and concludes that such delineations should be abolished to pervent abuses of the new correctional biotechnology.
Abstract
Trends in the relationship between criminal law and psychiatry are reviewed, followed by a discussion of problems associated with the criminally insane status. Rouse v. Cameron is cited as an example of the tendency to confine individuals labeled as criminally insane for longer periods than comparable persons categorized as either criminal or insane. Although it cannot be proved empirically that the criminally insane are sufficiently different from other offenders to warrant separate treatment, this classification may threaten other social values. A 1973 Detroit psychosurgery trial and recent social science experiments involving the effects of punishment on learning suggest that the criminally insane status produces candidates for technologies that scientists would not dare practice on anyone else. This same dynamic becomes visible within correctional institutions, as evidenced by experiments with the drug 'anectine' conducted at California's psychiatric treatment facility for convicted offenders during the late 1960's. Arguments for and against retention of the criminally insane status are examined according to the following doctrines: incompetency to stand trial, civil commitment for dangerousness, the insanity defense, and statutes which have created hybrid categories such as criminal sexual psychopath or defective delinquent. Inmates who have been found mentally ill during their prison terms are also considered. The court's role in reviewing the criminally insane category is explored, and current trends in equal protection analysis are criticized. Jackson v. Indiana is presented as an effective decision which undermines all criminally insane statuses by ruling that a mentally ill defendant can be confined only for the same reasons that the State holds either all criminal defendants or all mentally ill persons. The article contains 116 footnotes.