NCJ Number
195228
Journal
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology Volume: 91 Issue: 3 Dated: Spring 2001 Pages: 567-596
Date Published
2001
Length
30 pages
Annotation
This article discusses whether the holding in Miranda v. Arizona can be justified after the United States Supreme Court’s ruling in Dickerson v. United States.
Abstract
Miranda held that the prosecution could not use statements stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrated the use of a procedural safeguard to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. Harris v. New York began a series of exceptions to this case based upon the premise that a violation of Miranda does not necessarily violate the Constitution. The author disagrees with the claim that Miranda is about due process rather than self-incrimination values. This interpretation would explain why waivers of Miranda are so easily found. Miranda would not fit into any of the categories of due process because there is no liberty interest that history and tradition establishes as being worthy of due process protections. The Court has routinely rejected a requirement of notice outside the trial setting regarding constitutional criminal procedural guarantees. Another reason why an attempt to place Miranda in the substantive due process component of the Fourteenth Amendment fails is the Court’s holding that where a particular constitutional guarantee protects against a particular type of challenged government action, that Amendment must be a guide for analyzing those claims. Because the Miranda warnings protect a defendant’s Fifth Amendment right not to be compelled to be a witness against himself, it ought to be analyzed under the self-incrimination clause. Two problems with a procedural due process right to Miranda warnings are: (1) all practices struck down on this ground impinged upon the truth-seeking function of the trial; and (2) the Court has instituted the same more-specific-provision rule as in the substantive due process area. Enshrining Miranda in due process separates it from the values animating the warnings, and subjects the Court to the charge of judicial occupation of executive and legislative functions. 141 footnotes