NCJ Number
43267
Date Published
1977
Length
16 pages
Annotation
SEVERAL ATTEMPTS TO DEVELOP DEDUCTIVE MODELS OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONMAKING ARE REVIEWED (INCLUDING THE SINGLE JUDGE CERTIORARI MODEL); IT IS CONCLUDED THAT SUCH MODELS HAVE LIMITED APPLICABILITY.
Abstract
A NUMBER OF ATTEMPTS HAVE BEEN MADE TO PREDICT VOTING BLOCS ON THE SUPREME COURT AND JUSTICE HUGO L. BLACK'S CERTIORARI DECISIONS HAVE BEEN USED TO CONSTRUCT A MODEL. THESE MODELS HAVE LITTLE PREDICTIVE ABILITY BUT ARE INTERESTING BECAUSE THEY FORCE RETHINKING OF OLD ASSUMPTIONS AND STIMULATE NEW THOUGHT. THESE MODELS MIGHT ALSO BE GENERALIZED TO THE OTHER COLLECTIVE DECISIONMAKING SITUATIONS IN THE COURTS, IN GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION, AND IN CORPORATE SITUATIONS. THESE MODELS DO EXPOSE BIASES, A FACTOR WHICH IS APPROPRIATE IN ALL AREAS IN WHICH CONCEPTS OF EQUALITY OR IMPARTIALITY ARE VIEWED AS LIMITATION ON OFFICIAL BEHAVIOR.