NCJ Number
116127
Journal
Philosophy and Public Affairs Volume: 18 Issue: 1 Dated: (Winter 1989) Pages: 81-88
Date Published
1989
Length
8 pages
Annotation
In his examination of views concerning the morality of self-defense, David Wasserman (1987) criticizes Phillip Montague's (1981) views on this subject.
Abstract
However, some basic premises of Montague's position are unscathed by Wasserman's objections; and Wasserman's own account has its own problem areas. Montague's position held that self-defense cases usually examined in considerations of morality belong to a more general class of cases in which individuals are faced with forced choices among alternative methods of distributing harm. Wasserman argues against this distribution hypothesis and provides examples purporting to show that under certain circumstances there is no compulsion to sacrifice the more culpable party when he or she is no longer the aggressor. This argument, however, does not affect the distribution thesis about the justification of self-defense because that thesis applies only to cases involving individuals who are in danger of being harmed as a result of the harmful actions of some members of their group. Further, the thesis makes no mention of comparative fault, and therefore is inapplicable to cases in which the victims of aggression are to some extent blameworthy for their own predicament. 9 footnotes.