National Policy for Deterring the Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction

• NCJ Number: 190011
• Author(s): Dale A. Blackburn; Robert K. Brannum; Dwayne R. Turmelle; Gregory T. Boyette; William M. Napolitano Jr.; Elise M. Vander Vennet; Steven C. Williams
• Date Published: April 1996
• Length: 67 pages
• Sale Source: Federation of American Scientists
• Publication Format: Dissertation/Thesis
• Publication Type: Thesis/Dissertation
• Language: English
• Country: United States of America
• Note: Downloaded August 31, 2001

Annotation

This document examines the capabilities and presents recommendations to modify and strengthen United States weapons of mass destruction (WMD) deterrent strategy.

Abstract

With the end of the Cold War, so went many restrictions to the conduct of States and non-State actors, including the acquisition and use of WMD. The method used to complete this study was a qualitative analysis. Since the United States has no offensive biological weapons capability and is in the process of dismantling its chemical weapons, nuclear weapons are the only remaining WMD possessed by the United States nuclear forces primarily act as a deterrent to nuclear weapons use by a state actor. The United States conventional forces, such as conventional and special forces, provide the next most lethal deterrent options and play an important role in deterring WMD use when United States nuclear response would not be appropriate. At the “lowest” or non-lethal end of the spectrum are those capabilities and options that might be termed force enhancement and protective measures, such as intelligence and intelligence sharing. Protective measures enhance the United States deterrent posture by raising doubts in the mind of the adversary about the efficacy of WMD use. Ballistic missile defense (BMD) may also play an important support role in deterring WMD use by increasing an adversary’s fear of failure. The provision of WMD-related or terrorist-related equipment and training to friendly countries also enhances deterrence. Recommendations include communicating a strong U.S. policy on how it will respond to WMD use. Such a policy should provide a definitive concept of how WMD use will be regarded by the U.S. and should focus U.S. responses at state actors. Also, the government should constitute a specially-trained crisis staff to facilitate a rapid policy response to WMD threats. Continued development of military capabilities will further strengthen U.S. deterrence efforts. Notes, appendices, and bibliography