NCJ Number
112964
Journal
Criminal Justice Policy Review Volume: 1 Issue: 1 Dated: (1986) Pages: 91-110
Date Published
1986
Length
20 pages
Annotation
This article develops a deterrence theory of punishment independent of Benthamiam utilitarianism.
Abstract
The normative justifications for punishment are retribution and deterrence of future crimes. Deterrence theory assumes that people respond to incentives (gains, advantages) and to disincentives (costs, disadvantages). Although deterrence theory has remained associated with Benthamian utilitarianism in folklore and in the minds of scholars, there is a distinction. Benthamiam utilitarianism views the legitimate purpose of social institutions as maximizing individuals' happiness and minimizing their suffering. Classic utilitarianism must be abandoned, however, because happiness is not homogeneous, divisible, and quantifiable, and it cannot be cardinally measured. Deterrence theory is not based in utilitarianism's concept of happiness. Deterrence theory advocates making prohibited actions so costly that most people most of the time will avoid law violations. Deterrence theory does not depend on any rationalist psychological theory but merely on the observation that most people are responsive to incentives and disincentives most of the time. Deterrence is not only related to the severity of punishment but also to the probability and the speed of its administration. The degree to which a given sample of people will be deterred by the threat of punishment will depend on their perceptions and personal characteristics. The percentage of people not deterrable by any type of threat is small. 24 notes.