NUCLEAR FACILITIES AND MATERIALS (FROM LEGAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, 1978, BY ALONA E EVANS AND JOHN F MURPHY - SEE NCJ-51633)

• NCJ Number: 51635
• Author(s): H H BROWN
• Date Published: 1978
• Length: 38 pages
• Corporate Author: Lexington Books; American Soc of International Law
• Publication Format: Document
• Language: English
• Country: United States of America

Annotation

THE TECHNICAL VULNERABILITIES OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS AND FACILITIES TO TERRORIST ACTIVITIES ARE UNDERSCORED, ALONG WITH THE LACK OF NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS FOR THEIR PROTECTION.

Abstract

NUCLEAR FACILITIES AND MATERIALS PROVIDE TARGETS THAT COULD SERVE TERRORIST OBJECTIVES. ALTHOUGH IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR TERRORISTS TO SABOTAGE NUCLEAR FACILITIES OR TO STEAL NUCLEAR MATERIALS, A TRAINED AND SKILLED GROUP COULD ACCOMPLISH THESE ENDS. THE LIKELIHOOD OF SUCH ACTS IS UNCLEAR, BUT THE SERIOUS POTENTIAL HARM TO THE PUBLIC AND VALUABLE ECONOMIC RESOURCES REQUIRES STATES TO TAKE EFFECTIVE MEASURES TO PROTECT AGAINST SUCH ATTACKS. NEITHER THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY, THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY STATUTE, NOR ANY OTHER TREATY COVERS THE SUBJECT OF PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF NUCLEAR FACILITIES AND MATERIALS. STATES HAVE TREATED PHYSICAL PROTECTION EXCLUSIVELY WITHIN THE DOMAIN OF THEIR NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY TO EXERCISE POLICE POWER AND DOMESTIC SECURITY RESPONSIBILITIES. THERE ARE NO INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS MANDATING THE USE OF UNIFORM PROTECTION PRACTICES AND NONE TO GOVERN THE SECURITY OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS IN INTERNATIONAL TRANSIT. ALSO, THERE IS NO SYSTEMATIC EXCHANGE AMONG STATES OF TECHNICAL, ADMINISTRATIVE, OR INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION CONCERNING PROTECTION OF FACILITIES OR MATERIALS OR OF INFORMATION CONCERNING TERRORISTS' THREAT POTENTIAL. NEITHER HAVE ANY INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS OR COORDINATIVE MECHANISMS BEEN DESIGNATED OR ESTABLISHED TO PLAN FOR OR COORDINATE PLANS FOR RESPONDING TO THE THEFT OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL FROM ONE STATE TO ANOTHER. EFFORTS TO COMMENCE A DIALOGUE ON PHYSICAL PROTECTION MATTERS THROUGH THE LONDON SUPPLIERS CONFERENCE, AD HOC PANELS, AND BILATERAL INFORMATION EXCHANGE MEETINGS HAVE BEEN FRAGMENTED AND PIECEMEAL. FURTHER, THE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR ACTION AND RESPONSE BY STATES IN THE EVENT OF A THEFT OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS ACROSS INTERNATIONAL BORDERS ARE UNCLEAR AND UNARTICULATED FOR EVEN THE LEAST COMPLEX SITUATION. FINALLY, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY WOULD COMPLICATE AND PERHAPS FRUSTRATE EMERGENCY ACTIONS BY ONE STATE OR SEVERAL STATES ACTING COLLECTIVELY TO LOCATE AND RECOVER NUCLEAR MATERIALS STOLEN IN ANOTHER STATE. IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT THE U.S., IN COOPERATION WITH OTHER NATIONS, SHOULD SEEK TO DESIGNATE AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OR TO ESTABLISH A FORMAL MECHANISM TO DEAL WITH PROTECTION MATTERS. REFERENCES AND JUDICIAL DECISIONS ARE CITED. (KBL)