Nuclear Material Trafficking: An Interim Assessment

• NCJ Number: 162049
• Author(s): P Williams; P N Woessner
• Date Published: 1995
• Length: 43 pages
• Sale Source: University of Pittsburgh
• Publication Type: Issue Overview
• Language: English
• Country: United States of America
• Note: Ridgway Viewpoints No. 95-3

Annotation

The danger posed by nuclear material smuggling may be underestimated, in part because many questions persist on the nature of the trade and driving forces behind it.

Abstract

The dynamics of nuclear material smuggling are analyzed in terms of suppliers, smuggling organizations, and end users. The analysis draws inferences about connections among suppliers, smugglers, and end users in a way that makes it possible to delineate different kinds of supplier chains and networks. Based on a survey of overall trends, a careful examination of major incidents, and an effort to discern who suppliers and end users are, the analysis suggests that different kinds of supply chains exist and that intelligence and law enforcement are not likely to be totally successful. An inverse relationship is noted between the capacity of intelligence and law enforcement agencies to penetrate and disrupt nuclear material smuggling networks on the one hand and the significance of these networks on the other hand. Four difficulties associated with assessing the scale and severity of the nuclear smuggling problem are identified: (1) sensitive nature nuclear material smuggling, such that intelligence agencies are rarely willing to confirm the precise extent of the problem; (2) Russian sensitivities and the belief in some quarters that the danger of nuclear material smuggling is being artificially exaggerated to put Russia's nuclear weapons under international control; (3) prevalence of "con men" and "scam artists" in the nuclear material market; and (4) nature of the nuclear materials themselves. Opportunities for suppliers are examined, along with various types of suppliers and end users, including terrorist organizations. Policy recommendations to minimize the threat posed by nuclear material smuggling are proposed, including international cooperation, intervention at the source, improved intelligence collection on the dynamics of the nuclear material black market, legislation, and effective sanctions. Appendixes contain data and narrative on nuclear smuggling incidents between 1991 and 1994. 84 endnotes