NCJ Number
62385
Date Published
1977
Length
283 pages
Annotation
THE REPORT OF THE ENERGY PROGRAM OF THE U.S. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT DESCRIBES THE SOURCES AND CAPABILITIES OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS AND WEAPONS, AND DISCUSSES POLICY CONSIDERATIONS OF SAFEGUARDS.
Abstract
TO PROVIDE CONGRESS WITH THE ABILITY TO INDEPENDENTLY EVALUATE THE POLICYMAKING ACTIVITIES OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND THE GOVERNMENTS OF OTHER NATIONS AND TO BE PREPARED TO TAKE LEGISLATIVE ACTIONS REGARDING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND SAFEGUARDS, THE ENERGY PROGRAM REVIEWED INFORMATION OF NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION AND WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT. PAST APPROACHES TO THE CONTROL OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION WILL NOT FUNCTION FOR DEVELOPING NATIONS WHICH REQUIRE ATOMIC POWER IN COMPENSATION FOR THEIR LACK OF OIL RESOURCES. HOWEVER, THE TECHNOLOGICAL, INSTITUTIONAL, AND POLITICAL ASPECTS OF NUCLEAR ENERGY STILL REQUIRE SOME FORM OF CONTROL OVER THE PROCUREMENT OF ATOMIC WEAPONRY. STATES STILL ARE MOTIVATED TO ACQUIRE NUCLEAR WEAPONS BECAUSE OF FEAR OF ATTACK OR AS A MEANS OF INCREASING INTERNATIONAL STATUS. A NONSTATE ADVERSARY MAY PERCEIVE THE ACQUISITION OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR RADIOLOGICAL DEVICES TO BE AN INSTRUMENT FOR BLACKMAIL OR REVENGE. DEBATES OVER WHAT SAFEGUARDS ARE NEEDED AND HOW THEY WOULD AFFECT CIVIL LIBERTIES REVEAL THAT WIDESPREAD USE OF PLUTONIUM WOULD REQUIRE EXTREMELY INTENSE SECURITY, SURVEILLANCE, AND PERSONNEL RESTRICTIONS. NEVERTHELESS, IF A COUNTRY REQUIRED A PLUTONIUM ECONOMY, A WELL-REGULATED INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY SYSTEM COULD BE DEVELOPED AS THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY GREW. RISKS OF DIVERSION COULD BE REDUCED BY CENTRALLY LOCATED NUCLEAR FACILITIES. A MINIMUM WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM FOR ANY NATION REQUIRES AT LEAST A DOZEN TRAINED PERSONNEL, ALTHOUGH BOMBS COULD BE STOLEN BY DETERMINED TERRORISTS. INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS WITH ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY ARE RECOMMENDED FOR CONTROLLING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION. A GLOSSARY AND TABULAR DATA ARE PROVIDED. (TWK)