NCJ Number
153047
Journal
American Criminal Law Review Volume: 31 Issue: 4 Dated: (Summer 1994) Pages: 1253-1277
Date Published
1994
Length
25 pages
Annotation
The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B. (to prohibit gender-based peremptory strikes in jury selection) may not be an appropriate or effective way to redress a prior history of discrimination nor to accommodate the needs of legal feminist doctrine.
Abstract
In a 6-to-3 decision, the J.E.B. court held that "the Equal Protection Clause prohibits discrimination in jury selection on the basis of gender," and outlawed the use of gender-based peremptory strikes in jury selection. This analysis does not address the wisdom of this decision. Rather, it questions whether the assumptions underlying the Court's conclusion are suspect. The Court was influenced by the suggestion that gender-based peremptory strikes are impermissible because they perpetuate women's historical exclusion from the political process. The Court seemed to accept the notion that women would be disproportionately excluded if attorneys were allowed to strike a juror on the basis of gender. After documenting the exclusion of women from juries in the United States, this study then presents data collected from the District of Columbia District Court and analyzes the extent to which peremptory challenges are used to eliminate women and men from these juries. The findings suggest that men, and not women, are more vulnerable to exclusion from modern juries. Consulting various feminist legal theories, this study used the empirical data to reassess J.E.B.'s proposition that women, like racial minorities, require protection from unchecked peremptory strikes to ensure their place on the jury. 2 tables and 113 footnotes.