NCJ Number
219187
Journal
Law Enforcement Technology Volume: 34 Issue: 5 Dated: May 2007 Pages: 70,72,74,79
Date Published
May 2007
Length
8 pages
Annotation
This article describes the development and pilot testing of New York City’s (NYC’s) emergency communications system and considers issues related to homeland security funding.
Abstract
Following the terrorist attacks in September 2001, New York City aggressively pursued the development of a comprehensive and reliable emergency communications system. The Request for Proposal requirements were stringent and included: (1) 2 Mbps data and full-motion video for vehicles moving at speeds as fast as 70 mph; (2) Automatic Vehicle Location systems for 5,000 vehicles; (3) 1,000 wireless call boxes; and (4) wireless traffic control for signals at as many as 8,000 intersections. Northrop Grumman Corp. was awarded the 5-year, $500 million contract to build, equip, and maintain the citywide mobile wireless data network for public safety. A full year away from implementation, it appears as if the project will not only meet expectations, but exceed them. The project meets all three of the goals outlined by the 9/11 Commission report, which stated that communications systems should be implemented to include: (1) full backup if one sector fails; (2) the ability for an incident commander to see the big picture from a remote location; and (3) the capability to include other agencies necessary for incident command at a moment’s notice. The full-scale pilot testing of the system, conducted in June 2006, indicated that the system performed as expected. The communications system is now operational throughout Lower Manhattan south of Canal Street. The remainder of the article describes the tension surrounding the allocation of homeland security funding to States, which is based on a formula that considers threat, vulnerability, and the consequences of a terrorist attack. Critics point out the faults with such formula allocations for homeland security funding, including the criticism that such formulas are unrealistic and fail to protect the areas most likely to sustain an attack.