Opportunities and Barriers in Probation Reform: A Case Study of Drug Testing and Sanctions, Detailed Research Findings

• NCJ Number: 203848
• Author(s): Mark A. R. Kleiman; Thomas H. Tran; Paul Fishbein; Maria-Teresa Magula; Warren Allen; Gareth Lacy
• Date Published: 2003
• Length: 46 pages
• Corporate Author: California Policy Research Ctr
• Sale Source: California Policy Research Ctr
• Publication Format: Document (Online)
• Publication Type: Case Study
• Language: English
• Country: United States of America
• Note: *This document is currently unavailable from NCJRS. Downloaded January 15, 2004.

Annotation

This document discusses the use of a combination of drug testing and sanctions to monitor drug use among offenders.

Abstract

There is considerable theory and evidence supporting the idea that a properly focused program of frequent drug testing and swift, consistent, but not severe, sanctions for violations, along with formal drug treatment for those that need it or want it, could substantially shrink the volume of drug use and the recidivism rate among probationers, and reduce the aggregate amount of time drug-using offenders spend behind bars. The combination of testing and sanctions, called coerced abstinence, has important advantages over the currently more fashionable approach of coerced treatment. Testing-and-sanctions programs are much cheaper than treatment, and using them as the first-tier response avoids running into the capacity limitations of the treatment system. They also open treatment slots for those that want help for their drug problems rather than having help forced upon them. Coerced abstinence avoids the problem of managing treatment compliance and of imposing drug treatment on offenders that do not meet the clinical criteria defining drug abuse or dependence. In three case studies of California probation departments before the advent of Proposition 36 -- in Los Angeles, San Diego, and Santa Cruz counties -- it was found that none had a satisfactory program to address the problem of illicit drug use among its clients. The high rates of noncompliance were both a result and one of the causes of inconsistencies and delays in the sanctions process. The clear policy implications of this finding are that the probation departments need to tighten their monitoring and sanctioning of probationers’ drug use, and that resources spent on these tasks would have benefits to the public well in excess of their costs. Drug testing an offender twice a week leaves almost no opportunity for undetected drug use. Combining that with consistent sanctions for every failure to appear and every instance of detected drug use should be adequate to lower the rate of noncompliance among whatever part of the caseload could be made subject to that system. 4 tables, 3 figures, 25 footnotes