NCJ Number
61536
Date Published
1975
Length
287 pages
Annotation
THE POLITICAL CONTEXT OF ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR IN THE ILLINOIS JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM IS ASSESSED, THE PURPOSE BEING TO DEMONSTRATE THAT SELF-INTEREST CONCERNS ARE CRITICAL IN THE CHANGE PROCESS.
Abstract
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF BUREAUCRATIC ORGANIZATIONS, SUCH AS JUVENILE JUSTICE AGENCIES, IS THE PRIMARY THEORETICAL FOCUS OF THE STUDY. A MODEL IS DERIVED THAT ENCOMPASSES BOUNDARIES OF BOTH THE JUVENILE JUSTICE FIELD IN TIME AND SOCIAL SPACE AND STRUCTURAL AND PROCESS FEATURES OF THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM. CASE STUDIES ARE TO PROVIDE A VIEW OF EVENTS TYPIFYING THE ROLE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AGENCIES IN THE POLITICAL LIFE OF STATE GOVERNMENT. THE ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS' JUVENILE DIVISION IS THE CENTRAL UNIT OF ANALYSIS, ALTHOUGH FIELD INTERVIEWS WERE CONDUCTED TO OBTAIN INFORMATION FROM AGENCIES REPRESENTING ALL LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT. FINDINGS INDICATE THAT THE ILLINOIS JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM HAS UNDERGONE ABRUPT ORGANIZATIONAL AND POLICY CHANGES IN THE 1970'S. THESE CHANGES HAVE BEEN LARGELY STIMULATED BY FEDERAL PARTICIPATION IN EFFORTS TO REFORM STATE, COUNTY, AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION OF JUVENILE JUSTICE ACTIVITIES. UNDER CONDITIONS OF FEDERALLY-STIMULATED PLANNED CHANGE, ELECTED OFFICIALS AND ADMINISTRATORS IN ILLINOIS HAVE ADAPTED THEIR PLANNING TO RESPOND TO SUGGESTIONS FOR NEW PROGRAMS, GOALS, PROCEDURES, AND STRUCTURES. INCENTIVES OFFERED BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HAVE INCLUDED INCREASED FUNDING AND EXPANDED MANDATES. RESPONSES TO THESE INCENTIVES HAVE BEEN CHARACTERIZED BY GENERAL GROWTH IN THE NUMBER AND SIZE OF ORGANIZATIONS PARTICIPATING IN THE JUVENILE JUSTICE NETWORK AND BY INTERORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR RANGING FROM COOPERATIVE COMPETITION TO DISRUPTIVE CONFLICT. SUCH RESPONSES ARE TIED TO THE STRUCTURE OF SELF-INTERESTS CONCERNED WITH ELECTORAL AND BUREAUCRATIC ADVANTAGE, THE FORMER HAVING TO DO WITH THE CONTROL OF VOTING CONSTITUENCIES AND THE LATTER HAVING TO DO WITH EXPANDED SERVICE JURISDICTIONS AND INCREASED FUNDING. IT IS CONCLUDED THAT SELF-INTEREST CONCERNS PLAY A ROLE IN SHAPING THE BEHAVIOR OF PUBLIC BUREAUCRACIES. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON THE INVESTIGATION IS CONTAINED IN APPENDIXES. FOOTNOTES, TABLES, FIGURES, AND A BIBLIOGRAPHY ARE PROVIDED. (AUTHOR ABSTRACT MODIFIED--DEP)