NCJ Number
125514
Journal
Law and Society Review Volume: 24 Issue: 2 Dated: (1990) Pages: 413-450
Date Published
1990
Length
38 pages
Annotation
This article documents and explains the emergence of implicit plea bargaining in the Federal district courts during the Progressive and Prohibition periods.
Abstract
Three competing explanations for plea bargaining are tested statistically: the caseload, the substantive-justice, and the evidentiary-quality arguments. The caseload argument holds that plea bargaining arises as incoming court caseloads overwhelm the court's capacity to conduct full trials. The substantive-justice argument reasons that plea bargaining is used to substitute flexible sentencing standards for rigid and often excessively harsh sentencing standards. The evidentiary-quality argument holds that plea bargaining enables the prosecutor to secure some punishment for apparently guilty defendants when evidence is marginally sufficient to meet the burden of proof for the initial charge. The analysis yielded qualified support for all three arguments. The historical operation of each of the arguments, however, was shaped by the preoccupation of Federal judges with their professional self-image in the context of Prohibition. Implicit plea bargaining in the Federal courts emerged reflexively as an unintended consequence of the failed Progressive assault on the "corrupt" explicit plea bargaining practices of lower State and county courts. 7 figures, 3 tables, 31 footnotes. (Author abstract modified)