PLEA BARGAINING, DECISION THEORY, AND EQUILIBRIUM MODELS - PART 2

• NCJ Number: 40251
• Journal: Indiana Law Journal Volume: 52 Issue: 1 Dated: (FALL 1976) Pages: 1-61
• Author(s): S S NAGEL; M NEEF
• Date Published: 1976
• Length: 61 pages
• Corporate Author: Indiana University
• Publication Format: Article
• Language: English
• Country: United States of America

Annotation

SECOND OF TWO ARTICLES DEVELOPING AND DEMONSTRATING MODELS TO INDICATE WHEN, WHY, AND AT WHAT POINT AN OUT OF COURT SETTLEMENT IS LIKELY TO OCCUR IN PLEA NEGOTIATIONS, AS WELL AS LIKELY ALTERNATIVES TO SETTLEMENT.

Abstract

THE EQUILIBRIUM MODELS, DEVELOPED IN THE FIRST ARTICLE ALONG WITH THE GENERAL THEORY, VIEW THE DEFENDANT AS THE BUYER AND THE PROSECUTOR AS THE SELLER IN A PLEA BARGAINING SITUATION, EACH ENTERING INTO THE BARGAINING PROCESS WITH A ROUGH NOTION OF HOW HIGH OR LOW HE IS WILLING TO GO BEFORE TURNING TO THE TRIAL ALTERNATIVE. THIS ARTICLE APPLIES THE EQUILIBRIUM MODELS TO THE DEFENDANT AND THE PROSECUTOR IN BOTH A GENERAL SITUATION AND IN SITUATIONS INVOLVING SPECIAL CONDITIONS CONCERNING THE DEFENDANT'S STRATEGIES TOWARD THE ALTERNATIVE AND BOTH PARTIES' DEGREE OF KNOWLEDGE OF THE CONTINGENT PROBABILITIES. APPENDIXES LISTING TERMS AND FORMULAS USED ARE INCLUDED AT THE END OF THIS ARTICLE. FOR PART 1, SEE NCJ-38673. (AUTHOR ABSTRACT MODIFIED)....EB